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Abstract 
In 2001 the Italian tertiary education system embarked in a broad process of reform. The 
main novelty brought by the reform was a reduction of the length of study to get a first 
level degree together with the introduction of a 2-years, second level, master degree. This 
paper aims at studying the effects of the reform in terms of fairness in educational 
opportunity. In order to do so we first define fairness criteria following a well-developed 
responsibility sensitive egalitarian literature, we then discuss existing inequality of 
opportunity measures consistent with these criteria, we show their relationship, and we 
adapt them to the educational framework. We finally employ this set of measures to show 
the evolution of fairness in the access to university in Italy before and after the reform. 
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Equality of opportunity (EOp hereafter) is a central theme in the political agenda
of many communities and it is often advocated to justify public intervention in an array
of policy areas. However the meaning of EOp remains vague and this may explain part
of its popularity. Dierent authors have interpreted EOp in very diverse ways, ranging
from non discrimination to egalitarianism. In the last two decades a number of authors
have shown that the possibility to interpret EOp in very distinct ways stems from the
dual nature of the EOp principle. EOp is in fact the result of the union of two princi-
ples, compensation and responsibility, that are partly compatible and partly con
icting.
Fleurbaey (1994, 2008) , Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2003), have explicitly discussed this
tension and have proposed fairness criteria that balance between the two principles. In
what follow we will endorse their approach to conceptualize dierent denitions of EOp
in education. Equality of educational opportunity (EEOp hereafter) is not easily dened.
A number of additional issues challenge such a denition: given that education is the
main means to create opportunities for economic and social success should EOp require
equal educational outcome instead of equal opportunity in education? Is it meaningful
to apply a responsibility principle to children and young adults? Should an educational
system reinforce dierences in talent or instead compensate for them?
We discuss all these issues in section 2, where, building on the existing literature on
fairness and opportunity inequality, we propose our denitions of EEOp. In the same
section we make our proposal operational: we introduce a model to measure inequality
of educational opportunity (IEOp hereafter). In this model the individual outcome is
determined by the joint eect of circumstances beyond individual control, characteristics
for which the individuals are held responsible (called eort), and a random factor. In this
framework we adapt to the education context four IOp measures that have been already
proposed in the literature: direct unfairness and fairness gap, proposed by Fleurbaey
and Schokkaert (2009) within the health context, and ex ante and ex post proposed by
Peragine (2002) and Checchi and Peragine (2009) within the income inequality context.
Moreover, we discuss the relationship among these measures and underline the dierent
ethical principles they embody.
In section 3 our measures are used to evaluate the eect of the recent university
reform in Italy. In 2001 the Italian university system embarked in a broad process of
reform. The reform was proposed as a solution for a number of problems aicting
the Italian tertiary education sector, among them the fact that enrollment was highly
correlated with socioeconomic background. To evaluate wether the reform succeed in
improving EEOp we estimate our model of access using four waves of the Istat (Italian
Nationa Statistical Oce) database on college graduates career. These data contain a
wide range of information about the students performance at school and their activity
after graduation. We partition relevant variables in circumstances and responsibility
characteristics. We then measure unfairness in access to university in two years before
the reform (1995, 1998) and two years after (2001, 2004) for all possible variants of our
measures. Section 4 presents our results. We obtain an unambiguous reduction of IEOp
2after the reform which proves to be robust to all measures specications we adopted.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Fairness as equality of educational opportunity
Equality of educational opportunity (EEOp, hereafter) is a widely agreed principle,
almost universally considered to be a funding principle of education policy. EEOp prin-
ciple is not controversial because it merges two powerful ideas: that all young individuals
should have equal chance to succeed in life and that more hard working students should
emerge in the education competition. Agreement about EEOp principle derives also
from its vagueness. Dierent authors have proposed a number of interpretations ranging
from securing the absence of legal discriminatory barriers to access education to equality
of educational outcomes. In this section we brie
y review the most in
uential denitions
of EEOp, we present a simple model of access to education, and we propose four measure
of IEOp.
2.1 Dening EEOp: theoretical framework
The libertarian approach represents the most restrictive interpretation of the EEOp
meaning. According to educational libertarians the only legitimate rights are negative,
and the state is never allowed to redistribute resources between individuals without
their consent (Fleurbaey, 2007). Therefore, as claimed by Friedman (1962), public in-
tervention in education may be only justied in order to correct externalities or ensure
a minimum education level1.
At the opposite extreme there is a strand of the literature that interprets EEOp as
equality of educational outcomes. This interpretation focuses on the role of education
as an instrumental good: skills acquired in school and university produce income oppor-
tunities in the future. Consequently if fairness means equality of opportunity then the
source of opportunity should be equalized across all individuals (Howe, 1989).
In between these two extreme perspectives a number of EEOp interpretations have
been proposed. The right to \adequate education" has been claimed by some authors
(Gutmann, 1987; Curren, 1995). Others propose instead a meritocratic interpretation
of EEOp. In this latter perspective education resources should be distributed to those
who can make the most use of them, and therefore redistribution should reward the joint
eect of talent and eort (Brighouse, 2009).
Roemer (1993, 1998), following a robust philosophical literature2, argues that to
achieve equality of opportunity an education system must neutralize the eects of cir-
cumstances on the education attainments and let unaltered the eects of choices; that
is it must make all individuals able to freely chose from the same set of possible educa-
tion attainments. This EEOp denition overlaps to a large extent with what Fleurbaey
(2008) calls fairness in a responsibility sensitive egalitarian perspective. As underlined by
1These points are agreed by all EEOp declinations.
2Dworkin (1981a,b); Arneson (1989); Cohen (1989).
3Fleurbaey this denition is based on two distinct principles: compensation and reward3.
Compensation prescribes to remove inequality in education level due to circumstances
beyond individual control, reward to implement a policy neutral with respect to dif-
ferences due to choices. In a responsibility sensitive approach therefore EEOp means
that all students should face the same set of possible choices between education and ef-
fort. Then inequality between opportunity sets is inequitable while inequality of actually
achieved outcomes within the set of opportunities is not. We share this approach and
we represent a simple model of access to university in this theoretical framework.
2.2 A simple model of educational opportunity
We are interested in modeling equality of opportunity in the access to university.
After the school, students have two possibilities: they apply for university or they do
something else4. Hence university enrollment is modeled as a binary variable s, so that
for all individuals k 2 f1;;:::;Kg;sk 2 f0;1g: Our aim is to dene criteria of equality of
opportunity with respect to this choice.
Now, a number of variables in
uence students' educational choice. On the one hand
to go to university involves advantages such as expecting better labour market oppor-
tunities and spending some years in a stimulating environment. On the other hand, to
enroll in a university program involves costs, direct and opportunity or indirect costs.
Both advantages and costs are function of circumstances beyond individual control and
are evaluated on the basis of individuals' preferences. For example, a student coming
from a poor socioeconomic background may nd it hard to access credit necessary to
pay university fees; on the other hand, coming from a rich and well educated family
environment can shape individuals' attitude toward the studying activity. Note that
among circumstances there is also the set of mechanisms that regulates the university
system: the length of study, the amount of fees, the workload and all other variables
that can in
uence the probability to enroll. A basic ingredient of the EOp literature is
the partition of the individual characteristics into circumstances and eort. Hence, all
variables in
uencing the costs and advantages of accessing university that are beyond
the individual control are called circumstances c 2 fc1;:::;cng. On the other hand, all
individuals' characteristics that in
uence the university enrollment choice that are under
individual control and for whom students are held responsible are called eort e. We
assume there are m possible discrete degrees of eort: e 2 fe1;:::;emg:
In our model the two individual traits, e and c, do not fully determine the access
probability of individuals: there is a random component, , assumed to be independently
and identically distributed across individuals: for all k = 1;:::;K; sk = s(ci;ej;k). For
each combination of circumstances ci and eort ej;we dene the expected value E(sjc =
ci;e = ej) which corresponds to the probability of accessing the university for individuals
endowed with circumstances ci and exerting eort ej:Therefore we can represent the
3In this context we call reward what Fleurbaey calls liberal reward principle Fleurbaey (2008).
4No entrance barriers are assumed, so applying to university means to enroll. This description is
appropriate in a public founded University as the Italian one.
4population of students as a matrix of expected probability to access university up to an
orthogonal random component.
Table 1: Access to university: modeled distribution
e1 e2 ... em
c1 E(sjc1;e1) E(sjc1;e2) ... E(sjc1;em)
c2 E(sjc2;e1) E(sjc2;e2) ... E(sjc2;em)
::: ::: ... :::
cn E(sjcn;e1) E(sjcn;e2) ... E(sjcn;em)
We call `tranche' the portion of student population sharing same eort (in the same
column), `type' the set of students sharing the same circumstances (in the same row);
students sharing the same eort and the same circumstance belong to the same `cell'.
All denitions of fairness we will introduce refer to cells and, specically, to the expected
probability associated to the cell. The education system is considered fair if the distri-
bution of probability across cells obeys certain fairness criteria. How the probability is
distributed within cells is not considered ethically relevant. This choice is not irrelevant
and may be challenged, after all if responsibility is correctly captured by our measure of
eort, why variability within cells should be considered unproblematic? However, this
choice, which is consistent with the majority of the applied literature, is based on the
idea that if in principle we would like not random eect such as luck to aect educational
outcome, in practice we believe that the existence of such random component, given that
this is uncorrelated with socioeconomic characteristics, can hardly be attribute to the
fairness of the educational system. In this perspective EEOp means equal chances and
among them equal risk not to succeed because of luck.
2.3 Equality of educational opportunity: from fairness criteria to in-
equality measures
Following Roemer's (1993, 1998) and Fleurbaey's (2008) theoretical framework in
the last decade an extensive literature concerned with the measurement of inequality
of opportunity (IOp) has emerged. Measurement methods have attempted to isolate
the share of inequalities due to unequal opportunities from inequalities due to individual
choices. However, because of the impossibility to nd a measure of IEOp consistent with
both principles of Compensation and Reward, in specifying their measures most authors
have implicitly or explicitly given precedence to the former or the latter principle. The
tension between the two principles is well discussed by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2003)
and Fleurbaey (2008): the reward principle prescribes to consider as fair the inequalities
among individuals characterized by identical circumstances; on the other hand, some
of these inequalities are instead considered as unfair in the compensation perspective,
which primarily recognizes as unfair all inequalities among individuals that exerted same
5degree of eort. Excluding very specic cases, the measures inspired by the two prin-
ciples necessarily dier and a question arises about which one has to be considered the
correct one5.
In this section, following the approach of Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009), we start
from basic requirement of fairness and discuss dierent ways in wich consistent measure
of inequality can be derived. The two general principles of fairness are (Fleurbaey and
Schokkaert, 2009)
Condition 1 (Reward). A measure of unfair inequality should not re
ect legitimate
variation in outcomes, i. e. inequalities which are caused by dierences in eort.
Condition 2 (Compensation). If a measure of unfair inequality is zero, there should
be no illegitimate dierences left; i.e. two individuals with the same eort should have
the same outcome.
These two general conditions have been weakened in dierent ways by the existing
literature. Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009), building on the literature of fair allocation,
propose the following solutions:
Solution 1a (Conditional equality) Fleurbaey (2008). Take a reference responsibil-
ity, an education system is fair if all individuals exerting reference responsibility obtain
the same outcome.
Assume ~ e is the reference: then there is EEOp if and only if: E(sjci; ~ e) = E(sj~ e)
8ci 2 fc1;:::;cng.
Solution 1a satises reward and declares inequality between individuals in the same
circumstance class as irrelevant; it also obeys to compensation but only for individuals
with reference eort: all inequality among them is considered unfair.
Solution 2a (Egalitarian equivalence) Fleurbaey (2008). Take a reference circum-
stances, an education system is fair if all individuals get the same outcome they would
get with unchanged responsibility characteristic but reference circumstance.
Assume ~ c is the reference: then there is EEOp if and only if: E(sj(ci;ej)) = E(sj~ c;ej)
8ej 2 fe1;:::;emg and ci 2 fc1;:::;cng.
Solution 2a satises fully compensation, as inequality between individuals exerting
the same eort is unfair; it also obeys to reward for individuals with reference circum-
stance: all inequality among them is considered unproblematic.
A dierent approach to measurement is proposed by Peragine (2002) and Checchi
5Formally this impossibilities always arises when the cross derivative of circumstances and eort on
outcome dier from zero.
6and Peragine (2009).
Solution 1b (Ex ante approach) Checchi and Peragine (2009). An education system
is fair if individuals that share the same circumstances have the same expected outcome.
There is EEOp if and only if: E(sjci) = E(s) 8ci 2 fc1;:::;cng.
Solution 1b focuses on reward but does not guarantee consistency with compensation
(or it does if s(c;e)) is additive separable).
Solution 2b (Ex post approach) Checchi and Peragine (2009). An education system
is fair if individuals that exerted the same eort have the same expected outcome.
There is EEOp if and only if: E(sjci;ej) = E(sjch;ej) 8i;h 2 f1;:::;ng, 8j 2
f1;:::;mg.
Solution 2b focuses on compensation but does not guarantee consistency with reward
(or it does if s(c;e)) is additive separable).
Starting from these 4 dierent fairness criteria, consistent inequality measures can
be derived by considering the distance between the actual outcome distribution and the
fair distribution.
Hence, Solutions 1a and 2a lead respectively to Direct unfairness (DU), which mea-
sures to what extent the actual distribution violates conditional equality, and to Fairness
gap (FG), which is a measure of the distance between the observed distribution and egal-
itarian equivalence. On the other hand, Solutions 1b and 2b lead to ex ante (EA) and
ex post (EP) measures respectively. The four measures and requirements are reported
in table 2 where I is a suitable inequality measure:
Table 2: IEOp measures
generale principle fairness condition IEOp measure
reward conditional equality DU
E(sjci; ~ e) = E(sj~ e) IfE(sj(ci; ~ e)g
reward ex ante approach EA
E(sjci) = E(s) 8ci 2 fc1;c2;:::;cIg IfE(sjci)g
compensation egalitarian equivalence FG
E(sj(ci;ej)) = E(sj~ c;ej) IfE(sjci;ej)   E(sj~ c;ej)g
compensation ex post approach EP
E(sjci;ej) = E(sjch;ej) IfE(sjci;ej)   E(sjejg
72.4 Relationship between dierent measures
While the existing literature has discussed dierences and compatibilities between
DU and FG on one hand (see Fleurbaey and Schokkaert 2009), and ex ante and ex post
on the other (see Checchi and Peragine, 2009, Fleurbaey 2009, Fleurbaey and Peragine
2009), in this section we compare the two approaches. To the best of our knowledge, this
relationship has not yet been discussed in the literature6. Let us start by considering
the DU and FG measures. For the sake of clarity we can represent these measures by














> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
E(sjc1;e1)   E(sj~ c;e1) ::: E(sjc1;ej)   E(sj~ c;ej) ::: E(sjc1;em)   E(sj~ c;em)
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
0 ::: 0 ::: 0
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
E(sjcn;e1)   E(sj~ c;e1) ::: E(sjcn;ej)   E(sj~ c;ej) ::: E(sjcn;em)   E(sj~ c;em)
9
> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
DU and FG are equal if the probability generating process is additively separable7.
In this special case the advantage in terms of outcome of a circumstance is xed8 and
each column of the FG matrix become a replication of DU9. In the general case DU and
FG will dier and this dierence signals the existence of the already mentioned tension
between the compensation and reward principles. Given that there is no inequality
measure that can satisfy both principles, the IEOp measurement problem consists in
nding a balance between the two principles. We wish to nd a measure that to a
certain extent satises both compensation and reward.
Consider DU: it measures the inequality in outcome between types. To do so it picks
a reference level of eort and measures inequality in the distribution of outcome of indi-
viduals exerting reference eort across all circumstances. This measure is fully consistent
with the liberal reward principle because it obeys to the condition 1 general requirement.
Moreover, for students exerting ~ e DU is also consistent with compensation: it considers
unfair all the inequality within tranche ~ e. However, for all individuals exerting a dierent
eort, the consistency with the compensation principle is not guaranteed.
6There exists a discussion of dierent conditional equality and egalitarian equivalence allocation
rules in Fleurbaey (1994), Moulin (1994), and Fleurbaey (2008), but these discussions do not concern
inequality measurement and do not focus on compensation and reward violation as we do.
7That is: E(sjci;ej) = f(ci) + g(ej) for some functions f;g.
8That is, 8ci 6= ch 2 fc1;c2;:::;cng and 8ej = et 2 fe1;e2;:::;emg, E(sjci;ej)   E(sjch;ej) =
E(sjci;et)   E(sjch;et).
9An additional requirement is of course the replication invariance of I.
8We can represent DU's violation of the compensation principle using a matrix (V C)
in which each cell contains the dierence between the actual outcome and the outcome
that is imputed to it when a reference eort is chosen: E(sjci;ej)   E(sjci; ~ e). The
matrix is simply the subtraction of m replications of the DU vector from the modeled
distribution matrix (by construction the reference eort column is made of zero).




E(sjc1;e1)   E(sjc1; ~ e) ::: 0 ::: E(sjc1;em)   E(sjc1; ~ e)
::: ::: ::: ::: :::




Now assume that we drop the requirement to satisfy compensation for a reference
and we wish instead to nd a measure of inequality between types that minimize the
sum of compensation violations. To stick to liberal reward we have to represent each
individual in the same type with one and only one measure of outcome. Our problem
is therefore: nding the outcome associated to each type that minimizes the sum of
violations in each row of V C. The solution of our problem consists in taking the average
probability of each row10. Translated into DU terms, the reference eort ~ e is the eort
that generates the average probability in each type. Note, however, that in this case ~ e
is not necessary observed in the population and it is not xed across types (the same
result would be obtained if we were looking at the sum of the violations squared).
The solution of this problem shows the relationship between DU and EA: once the
DU set is substituted by the set of the types' average outcome, the inequality measure
we get is exactly the ex   ante measure of inequality of opportunity.
Dual to the DU's violation of the compensation principle is the FG's violation of
the reward principle.
When we focus on the compensation principle we are compelled to consider any
inequality within tranches as unfair. In each tranche inequality is given by the relative
advantage of being in dierent circumstances. To calculate FG we choose a reference
circumstance ~ c and we calculate inequality in each tranche as inequality in the distances
between the outcome in each cell and the outcome in the reference type cell. By doing
so we obtain a matrix of distances in which each row reports the distances in outcome
between each type and the reference level (by construction the reference type row is
made of zero). If the probability generating process is not additively separable in all
other rows, the distances will dier across tranches. These dierences suggest that in
each tranche the advantage of belonging to a type diers, which is a violation of the
reward principle: individuals in the same type should be considered equally well o
independently from their eort decision.
This violation is represented by a matrix of reward violations (V R). For each refer-
ence circumstance ci = ~ c, row h of V R is the dierence between the h th FG row and




9the same row when ch = ~ c. Note that whenever ch = ~ c the value associated by the FG
distribution to the h th row is 0. Therefore, for each chosen ~ c; the matrix of violations
is simply the matrix FG. We relax the requirement of consistency with reward for a
reference circumstance and we introduce the alternative requirement of minimizing the
sum of V R elements. Therefore we wish to nd the set of circumstances, one for each
tranche, that minimizes the sum of V R's elements (the same result is obtained if we
wish to minimize the sum of the violations squared).
V R = I
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
E(sjc1;e1)   E(sj~ c;e1) ::: E(sjc1;ej)   E(sj~ c;ej) ::: E(sjc1;em)   E(sj~ c;em)
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
0 ::: 0 ::: 0
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
E(sjcn;e1)   E(sj~ c;e1) ::: E(sjcn;ej)   E(sj~ c;ej) ::: E(sjcn;em)   E(sj~ c;em)
9
> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
It turns out that for each eort degree the reference circumstance that minimize the
sum of reward violations is the circumstance that generates the tranche's average out-
come11. Note that this circumstance does not necessary exist and that is not x across
eort tranches. Once the FG reference outcome in each tranche is substituted by the
set of the tranches' average, the inequality measure we obtain is EP12.
Let us summarize the discussion so far.
Remark Both DU and EA satisfy Reward; moreover, DU respects compensation
for reference eort, while EA minimizes the sum of violations of the principle of com-
pensation. On the other hand, both FG and EP satisfy Compensation; moreover, FG
respects reward for reference circumstance, while EP minimizes the sum of violations of
the principle of reward.
Table 3 summarizes these properties.
Table 3: IEOp measures properties for non additively separable probabilities













Finally, we can translate these measures in relative terms:
11The proof is intuitive and dual to the DU.
12The discussion proves also that EAP  FG. Note that this result is linked to the Average Egalitarian
Equivalence solution proposed by Moulin (1994) whenever eort and circumstances are not correlated
and individuals are uniformly distributed across cells.
10du = I fE(sjc1; ~ e);:::;E(sjcn; ~ e)g
fg = I
8
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ea = I fE(sjc1);:::;E(sjcn)g
ep = I
8
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> > > =
> > > ;
These measures are relative versions of DU, FG, EA, and EP13. They are not the
same whenever the probability generating process is not product separable. And they
have exactly the same properties and relationships once expressed in relative terms.
In what follow we will adopt du, fg, ea, and ep as unfairness measures. As shown,
these measures dier because they embody dierent versions of the EOp ethical princi-
ples. If we get consistent measures, then our results can be said to be robust to dierent
interpretations of what EEOp means. We consider ea and ep particularly valuable when
there is no a priori information on which reference characteristics should be chosen. The
Gini index is chosen as suitable inequality measure.
2.5 Measures implementation
This theoretical framework has been in some cases applied to evaluate inequality in
educational opportunity. Peragine and Serlenga (2007) apply a non parametric approach
to evaluate IOp in the distribution of grades and job market performance of a sample of
university graduated. Waltenberg and Vandenberghe (2006) Waltenberg (2009) follow
both the non parametric and the parametric approaches to evaluate EOp in educational
attainments.
As discussed by these authors to adopt a responsibility sensitive approach to EEOp
poses some peculiar problems. First of all can we consider students really responsible
for their eort decision? While it is clear that babies cannot be held responsible for
their choices it is less clear to what extent a teenager can. This issue has been discussed
by De Vill e and Trannoy (De Vill e, 2003) in the EEOp framework. Trannoy suggests
13ea, ep are the measures originally adopted by Checchi and Peragine (2009).
11that children cannot exert full responsibility when they are very young (below age t?)
moreover he claims that after time (t??) circumstances do not play any role in education.
In assuming so he delimitates an age in which eort does not exist, only compensation
should be applied, and an age in which only eort play a role, there only reward should
be applied. However, if t? and t?? do not coincide there is a period in which education
outcomes distribution should be evaluated adopting a balance of compensation and re-
ward. We do not agree with Trannoy and De Vill e when they suggest the existence of
time t??, there are evidence that the eect of circumstances on educational outcomes
never fades out, and for example aects the university graduation grade (Peragine and
Serlenga, 2007). We instead focus on t? that is, at what age can we start to consider
a student responsible for its eort14. To understand at which age approximately corre-
sponds t? is crucial. If students determine their access at time t < t? responsibility plays
no role in their educational outcome and there is no point in adopting a responsibility
sensitive unfairness measure.
A good benchmark for such a discussion is the legal literature on criminal responsi-
bility. After all if at a certain age individuals are held legally responsible for their actions
the same principle is probably implementable in the EEOp framework. Interestingly the
minimum age to be brought to court in OECD countries varies around an average of 13
years, followed by the minimum age to leave school (15-16) (Melchiorre, 2004) . This
seems to suggest that access to university education, that in Italy takes place around the
age of 19, can be evaluated following our methodologies without fear of holding students
responsible for choices they do not control. However, following the same reasoning we
should question all studies that measures IEOp in students with age around or below the
\responsibility age" 15. The closer educational outcomes are measured to t? the more
the use of responsibility sensitive measure is dicult to defend. Moreover given that the
cognitive skills accumulation process is highly in
uenced by skills already acquired, one
should consider education outcome at time t? as one of the circumstances in
uencing
educational achievements, this is the view that we follow.
The second critical point concern the role of talent. It is widely agreed that talent
contains an innate component and therefore in this framework should be considered a
circumstance and not rewarded as a responsibility characteristic (De Vill e, 2003 ). Nev-
ertheless authors that evaluate IEOp often obtain a measure that consider problematic
only observable circumstances such as socioeconomic condition, geographical location or
gender16. In what follow we partly correct this approach as we believe that to include
the educational outcome at t? among circumstances in part capture innate ability. If
the measure of outcome at 15 and at 19 are fully comparable and the eect of ability on
them is xed over time, then our measure of eort will not be biased by innate ability.
However, this assumption is rather strong and we are aware that our choice include
14However we also consider unsatisfactory to claim a discontinuity in the process of individual respon-
sibility formation. Responsibility may be better understood as a continuous process in which age and
experience improve individual judgment ability. Further research on this issue seems promising.
15This is the case for example of Waltenberg and Vandenberghe (2006) that use data on 14 years old
Brazilian students, or Ferreira and Gignoux (2007) that use data on 15 years old pupils.
16See Peragine and Serlenga (2007) or Waltenberg (2009) for example.
12in what should be rewarded a part of circumstance, it implicitly makes our measure a
compromise between the Roemer's and meritocratic EEOp  a la Brighouse17.
3 Evaluation of the university reform in Italy
3.1 The 2001 University Reform
The Italian university system before the 2001 reform was based on a \unitary one
tier" curses scheme, in place since the '30s, in which 4-6 years degree were the sole possi-
ble university careers without intermediate exit possibility18. In 1990 shorter university
degrees were introduced, the Italian system was moving toward a \binary one-tier" model
where old courses were coupled with shorter degrees. Moreover in 1990 Ruberti's law
introduced the so called autonomia universitaria allowing universities to increase the
variety of courses and degrees oered. However, both laws remained largely unimple-
mented by universities until 1999 when a broader reform took place.
In the late '90s many reasons for a comprehensive reform were advocated by policy
makers and academics: low enrollment rates, high drop out rates (OECD in 2000 re-
ported a survival rate for tertiary education of 42% in Italy versus an OECD average of
70%), low population share with an university degree (18% against an OECD average
of 28%), excessive length of study (MIURST reports in 1998-99 that 38.7% of the to-
tal university population was made by students spending in university more years than
the legal length of their course), loose links between university and the labour market.
Moreover, a major source of concern was that all these phenomena were highly correlated
with students socioeconomic background, with low access and low graduation rates for
students coming from poor socioeconomic background (Bratti et al., 2008).
The 1999 reform, implemented in the 2001-2002 academic year, transformed the
Italian system in a \unitary two-tiers" model: all students enroll in a 3 years degree
and then can enroll in a 1 year or 2 years master degree. The change from 4/6 to 3+2
degrees brought also a reform of curricula with a reduction of total number of exams,
that were now concentrated in 3 years, expansion of specialization elds and reduction
of exams' workloads (Bratti et al., 2007).
Aggregated data seem to show that the reform bought a large eect in terms of
enrollment rate in the years following 2001: Ministerial data show that the number of
degrees doubled from 2001 to 2006, with a constant increase in the years after the reform
(Bondonio, 2006), Istat also shows an increase in enrollment rates from 2001 to 2004
(ISTAT, 2006). However, Istat reports a turnaround after 2004 whith the enrollment
rate in 2007-2008 below the pre-reform level. Excluding a short run temporary increase
there has been virtually no eect of the reform in terms of aggregated enrollment rate.
17Our method is not a meritocratic IEOp measure because it considers unfair inequality due to talent
when talent is correlated with circumstances.
18Where not dierently specied the sources of these paragraph are: (Giannessi, 2006) and ministerial
decree law 509/1999.
13Many authors attempted to understand what were the consequences of such a reform
beside the increase in the enrollment. In particular a debate about the eectiveness of the
reform in tackling major limits of the old system has emerged. Cappellari and Lucifora
nd evidence of higher rate of access to university, especially for low income and talented
students (Cappellari and Lucifora, 2008). D'Hombres shows evidence of reduction in
drop out rates after reform (d'Hombres, 2007)19. Di Pietro and Cutillo nd a similar
positive eect of the reform with a signicant reduction in drop out rates (Di Pietro and
Cutillo, 2008). A skeptical explanation of the same phenomena is proposed by Bratti
et al. that nd an increase in university enrollment and a reduction in drop out rates,
but they underline the possible role of the reduction in university standard that followed
the reform (Bratti et al., 2007). Among reform evaluation contributions only Cappellari
and Lucifora (2008) devote explicitly attention to the focus of our analysis: the eects
of the reform in terms of equality of tertiary education opportunity20. If on the one
hand the literature considered circumstances in
uencing students performance among
determinants of their education achievements, on the other none of the existing reform
evaluations have explicitly dened criteria to estimate improvement of the university
system in terms of fairness.
3.2 Model specication and data description





1 with probability P(s = 1) = P
0 with probability P(s = 0) = 1   P
We introduce an unobservable index function which determines the value of the
binary outcome.
s =  + c + e +  (1)
Which outcome prevails is explained by a vector of circumstances c, eort e, and
a random component  whit mean zero and variance standardized logistic. We do not





s = 1 if s > 0
s = 0 if s  0
Given that the distribution is symmetric,
Pr(s > 0jc;e) = Pr( <  + c + e) = F( + c + e) (2)
19Similar positive eect in demand for tertiary education is found by Caroso et al. studying the eects
of the Bologna process in Portugal.
20Note that Bratti et al. focus on the same issue in a paper which however does not investigate the
eect of the reform (Bratti et al., 2008).
14Where F is the cumulative distribution function. F is therefore assumed logistic
and we estimate a logir model to describe how c and e participate in determining the
enrollment rate.
Pr(s = 1) = F( + c + e) =
e+c+e
1 + e+c+e (3)
The model is estimated and the whole predicted distribution is obtained. In each
cell the enrollment rate is substituted by the predicted enrollment rate:
s(ci;ej) =
e^ +^ c+^ e
1 + e^ +^ c+^ e (4)
This modeled distribution is used to calculate the elements of the IEOp distributions:
dui =
e^ +^ c+^ ~ e
1 + e^ +^ c+^ ~ e (5)
fgi;j = [
e^ +^ c+^ e
1 + e^ +^ c+^ e]=[
e^ +^ ~ c+^ e
1 + e^ +^ ~ c+^ e] (6)
eai =
e^ +^ c+^  e
1 + e^ +^ c+^  e (7)
epi;j = [
e^ +^ c+^ e
1 + e^ +^ c+^ e]=[
e^ +^  c+^ e
1 + e^ +^  c+^ e] (8)
where  c and  e are average circumstance and average eort whereas ~ c and ~ e are cir-
cumstances and eort of reference, respectively.
We estimate our enrollment model using data from \Indagine sull'Inserimento Pro-
fessionale dei Diplomati" (IIPD, hereafter) a survey on the transition from secondary
school to work and university of a representative sample of Italian students, who com-
pleted high school, conducted by Istat. We use waves 1998 (students that completed
high school in 1995), 2001 (1998), 2004 (2001) and 2007 (2004). These data contain in-
formation on students socioeconomic background, their school curricula and their access
to university/labour market after high school. Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for
the 4 IIPD waves21.
In model 2 outcome is obtained by a function of circumstances and eort. We consider
as relevant circumstances parental education level (mother/father graduated or not),
parental occupation (father unemployed or not), parental job qualication (white/blue
collar), gender, kind of secondary school attended (public/private; \liceo"/other schools),
and the grade obtained at time t? (i.e. secondary school nal grade, taken at age 15).
The eort level is instead approximated by comparing the grade of the college nal
21Data dier pretty much from (Cappellari and Lucifora, 2008) as these authors exclude all students
graduating in vocational schools.
15examination - undertaken at the age 19 - and the above mentioned secondary school
nal grade. Eort in school is a proxy of how hard a student tried and is generally not
observed. In what follows we use the relative variation of students grades at age 15 and
at age 19. We believe that improvement in education attainments is a more reliable
measure of eort than a single grade as the latter might be in
uenced by circumstances.
If the eect of the circumstances is constant over time, by using the relative variation
between grades we might be able to identify the "pure" eort eect - the eort which
is independent of circumstances - on the education attainment. As nal grades are
recorded in 4 levels in the survey both at age 15 and 19, we have 11 possible eort levels:
0.25, 0.33, 0.5, 0.667, 0.75, 1, 1.333, 1.5, 2, 3, 4.
The modeled distribution is therefore made by 11 columns and a number of rows
equal to the number of all possible circumstances combinations (4  211 = 8192, with
many empty cells). Complete descriptive statistics and the regression marginal eects
are reported in tables 7-10 in the Appendix A.
This policy evaluation exercise suers from a number of weakness. To correctly
evaluate the eect of a treatment, such as a reform, we should compare the situation
of the treated individuals (the cohort that experienced the reform in our case), with
their situation if they would not have been treated. However, since the reform involved
all students graduating from college at the same time, this strategy is impossible to
implement.22. In our analysis we simply compare students from dierent cohorts, one (or
more) pre 2001 and one after 2001. There are a number of issues that might challenge this
strategy. First of all students characteristics aecting students achievements may dier
across cohorts. This issue is solved by other authors including relevant characteristics as a
control in the model. Di Pietro and Cutillo, for example decompose the total change after
reform in two parts, one due to change in socioeconomic characteristics of the sample
and the other due to the reform (Di Pietro and Cutillo, 2008). In our case this issue
does not represent a problem as our measures are weighted by the relative population
in each cell and cells represent all possible combination of relevant characteristics.
A second crucial issue concerns the possibility of excluding that observed changes
would have taken place even without a reform, i.e. if observed changes are part of
a trend, they would have taken place anyway. However, the presence of a trend is
excluded looking at the data, Cappellari and Lucifora (2008) for example show that as
far as the aggregated enrollment rate is concerned the years before the reform show a
decreasing trend (see gure 1). Similarly we include in our IEOp measures two waves
before the reform (1995 and 1998) in order to check for the existence of a trend.
Finally, policy evaluation prescribes to consider all other possible exogenous variables
that could have in
uenced education achievements after the reform. Labour market
conditions are often considered among the most relevant variables in this context. We
expect some positive and some negative in
uence of unemployment on enrollment rate:
higher unemployment reduces the opportunity cost of attending university but increases
22Although there was some heterogeneity in the timing of implementation of the reform this could not
be exploited as it is clearly not randomly assigned to universities.
16Figure 1: Enrollment and youth unemployment rate: Istat and Miur.






















































19−25 unempl. rate (t−1)
17the diculties of nancing. however, there are evidence that a worsening of the labour
market condition could explain an increase in the enrollment rate of college graduates
especially for those coming from poorer socioeconomic sector of the population (Betts
and McFarland, 1995). This mechanism could bias our estimates. However, as shown
in gure 1, youth unemployment rate (19-25 years) has declined in the years before and
after 2001, hence if this trend induces a bias this is toward a larger IEOp.
4 Results
We calculate du, fg, ex ante, ex post, for the 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004 samples
of college graduate. Table 4 reports the results for du, for each of the reference eorts,
and for the ex   ante measure. Table 5 reports the quantiles of the fg distribution
together with ex   post.
Our estimates show unambiguously an improvement in the fairness in university
access after the 2001 reform. This conclusion is robust to the large range of measures
that we have adopted.
In particular we are able to show that this conclusion is valid both for IEOp measures
that give precedence to the compensation principle and for those that focus instead on
the reward principle. Nevertheless, this choice does matters for the results. As reported
in tables 4 and 5, du is always smaller than fg; and this is consistent with other ndings
in empirical applications of the same measures. The same relationship exists between
ex   post and ex   ante.
It is particularly interesting to check how dierent are the rankings of the distribution
of dierent years generated by dierent measures. In fact, in general, dierences in
magnitude generally do not imply any re-ranking. The only ambiguity arises in the
relative ranking of the 1995 and 2001 samples, when fairness in access seems to be
rather similar.
The reference characteristic also matters. In this case we claim that a comparison
between measures is meaningful. It suggests that dierent references in calculating the
same measure aect our estimate of unfairness in a given distribution. The minimum
du is obtained taking the maximum eort. The maximum du is obtained taking the
minimum eort. Note that the higher the reference the lower is unfairness for all inter
mediate reference eorts; this monotonicity suggests that, as far as access to education
is concerned, the eect of circumstance in conditioning the outcome is decreasing with
the degree of eort. These changes in magnitude again do not imply any re-ranking.
The reference circumstance plays also an important role on the fg measure.In the case
of reference circumstances it seems impossible to order them in an ambiguous way and
therefore the relationship between circumstances and unfairness measures remains less
clear. Note also that, as known by construction, ex   post is lower than any fg while
ex   ante varies around the du average.





























































































































Figure 3: Fairness gap distributions



































19Table 4: Direct unfairness and ex-ante
~ e 1995 1998 2001 2004
~ e = 1 0.398071 0.467451 0.407429 0.346126
~ e = 2 0.390913 0.461049 0.399482 0.339496
~ e = 3 0.375634 0.447312 0.382533 0.325430
~ e = 4 0.360290 0.433415 0.365538 0.311420
~ e = 5 0.353058 0.426827 0.357537 0.304855
~ e = 6 0.330465 0.406072 0.332586 0.284497
~ e = 7 0.300830 0.378406 0.299983 0.258124
~ e = 8 0.285735 0.364094 0.283443 0.244826
~ e = 9 0.242483 0.322105 0.236371 0.207189
~ e = 10 0.164423 0.241273 0.153221 0.140737
~ e = 11 0.102696 0.169759 0.090311 0.089060
ex   ante 0.277900 0.340965 0.277841 0.241561
Table 5: fairness gap distributions
year Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. ex   post
1995 0.4000 0.4079 0.4241 0.4278 0.4466 0.4720 0.3314
1998 0.4693 0.4809 0.4992 0.5002 0.5198 0.5363 0.4068
2001 0.4078 0.4125 0.4245 0.4300 0.4448 0.4765 0.3326
2004 0.3463 0.3487 0.3556 0.3627 0.3733 0.4103 0.2845
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we propose a conceptualization of EEOp which is based on the literature
on equality of opportunity and responsibility sensitive egalitarianism. This literature
has shown how EOp is a complex fairness principle in which dierent and sometimes
con
icting basic principles coexist. An ideal IEOp measure should be consistent with
both general principles of compensation and reward, however such a desirable measure is
impossible. Following the recent developments of the literature on IOp measurement we
have adopted, discussed, and adapted to the educational context two pairs of measures:
direct unfairness and fairness gap due to Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) and ex ante
and ex post due to Peragine (2002), Checchi and Peragine (2009). We have shown that,
each measure gives precedence to one of the principles keeping some kind of consistency
with the other one.
We have then adopted these four IEOp measures to evaluate the change in the access
to university in Italy in the last 15 years. This exercise is particularly interesting because
in 2001 the Italian university system embarked in a broad process of reform. The reform
was aimed at solving a number of weaknesses of the system, among them a limited EEOP.
20To do so we have partitioned college graduate into groups of students sharing the same
circumstances and we have dened a responsibility variable: the relative improvement in
their educational outcome during college. We then estimated our measures of unfairness
for all possible specications. Estimates are consistent and show a clear increase in
EEOp after the reform.
21A Descriptive statistics and regressions' output
Table 6: Summary
variable 1995 1998 2001 2004
N 17947 22060 19741 25249
enrollment 1.1684 (0.7076) 1.2733 (0.7453) 1.1809 (0.7082) 1.2071 (0.7158)
eort 2.163871 (1.0568) 2.1088 (1.0574) 2.1988 (1.1189) 2.3766 (1.1504)
score 15 2.1910 (1.0994) 1.985 (1.1529) 2.1486 (1.049) 2.2546 (1.044)
private 0.1136 (0.3173) 0.0717 ( 0.2580) 0.1273 (0.3334) 0.0575 (0.2328)
father grad. 0.0534 (0.2249) 0.0524 (0.2229) 0.0885 (0.2841) 0.0963 (0.2950)
mother grad. 0.0396 (0.1951) 0.0402 (0.1965) 0.0694 ( 0.2542) 0.0845 (0.2782)
father dip. 0.3639 (0.4811) 0.4054 (0.4909) 0.34182 (0.4743) 0.3768 (0.4845)
mother dip. 0.3679 (0.4822) 0.4160 (0.4929) 0.3411 (0.4741) 0.3887 (0.4874)
father unempl. 0.0122 (0.1097) 0.0152 (0.1224) 0.0216 (0.1454) 0.0165 (0.1277)
father w. col. 0.2554 ( 0.4361) 0.2303 (0.421) 0.3727 (0.4835) 0.3522 (0.4776)
mother w. col. 0.1004 (0.3006) 0.0850 ( 0.2789) 0.2245 (0.4173) 0.2165 (0.4118)
mother out l.f. 0 0.5726 (0.4947) 0.5882 (0.4921 ) 0.5162 (0.4997) 0.4656 (0.4988)
liceo 0.3294 (0.4700) 0.2167 (0.4120) 0.2569 ( 0.4369) 0.3327 (0.4711)
girl 0.5543 ( 0.4971) 0.5396 (0.4984) 0.5342 (0.4988) 0.5411 (0.4983)
north 0.4020 (0.4903) 0.3803 (0.4854) 0.3891 (0.4875) 0.4801 (0.4996)
All variables are dummy but eort, that ranges from 0.25 to 4, and score at
15, that ranges from 1 to 4.
22Table 7: Logit regression 1995, marginal eects
enrollment @s=@x Std. Err. z P > jzj 95% Conf. Int.
eort 0.1697612 0.00714 23.76 0.000 0.155758 0.183764
score 15 0.2042143 0.0054 37.81 0.000 0.193627 0.214801
private -0.0495374 0.01573 -3.15 0.002 -0.080359 -0.018716
father grad. -0.0149118 0.02046 -0.73 0.466 -0.055015 0.025192
mother grad- 0.0503403 0.02266 2.22 0.026 0.005936 0.094745
father dip. -0.061322 0.01024 -5.99 0.000 -0.081397 -0.041247
mother dip. 0.0051752 0.01008 0.51 0.608 -0.014587 0.024938
father unempl. -0.0467851 0.04071 -1.15 0.250 -0.126577 0.033007
father w. col. 0.144071 0.01042 13.82 0.000 0.12364 0.164502
mother w. col. 0.0710141 0.01778 3.99 0.000 0.036173 0.105855
liceo 0.4062856 0.00829 49.02 0.000 0.39004 0.422532
mother out l.f. -0.1136842 0.00965 -11.78 0.000 -0.132597 -0.094772
girl -0.068453 0.00931 -7.35 0.000 -0.08671 -0.050196
LR chi2 = 5845:07, Prob > chi2 = 0:0000
Log likelihood =  8672:8598 , Pseudo R2 = 0:2520
Table 8: Logit regression 1998, marginal eects
enrollment @s=@x Std. Err. z P > jzj 95% Conf. Int.
eort 0.1327186 0.00585 22.68 0.000 0.121251 0.144187
score 15 0.1700119 0.00468 36.30 0.000 0.160832 0.179192
private 0.0038911 0.0174 0.22 0.823 -0.030216 0.037998
father grad. -0.0173563 0.01791 -0.97 0.333 -0.052469 0.017756
mother grad. 0.014099 0.02044 0.69 0.490 -0.025968 0.054166
father dip. -0.0578025 0.00888 -6.51 0.000 -0.075213 -0.040392
mother dip. -0.0366076 0.00886 -4.13 0.000 -0.053981 -0.019234
father unempl. -0.0509449 0.03175 -1.60 0.109 -0.113182 0.011292
father w. col. 0.1293336 0.01005 12.87 0.000 0.109637 0.14903
mother w. col. 0.061239 0.01671 3.66 0.000 0.028484 0.093994
liceo 0.4508035 0.00917 49.15 0.000 0.432827 0.46878
mother out l.f. -0.0838148 0.00871 -9.62 0.000 -0.100893 -0.066737
girl -0.0143644 0.00824 -1.74 0.081 -0.030514 0.001785
LR chi2 = 6756:83, Prob > chi2 = 0:0000
Log likelihood =  10704:77 , Pseudo R2 = 0:2399
23Table 9: Logit regression 2001, marginal eects
enrollment @s=@x Std. Err. z P > jzj 95% Conf. Int.
eort 0.1836827 0.00645 28.49 0.000 0.171048 0.196318
score 15 0.2098497 0.00517 40.62 0.000 0.199723 0.219976
private -0.0464328 0.01431 -3.24 0.001 -0.074481 -0.018384
father grad. 0.1989497 0.01799 11.06 0.000 0.163691 0.234209
mother grad. 0.1787406 0.0214 8.35 0.000 0.136792 0.220689
father dip. 0.0766518 0.00996 7.70 0.000 0.057133 0.096171
mother dip. 0.0990043 0.01003 9.88 0.000 0.079355 0.118653
father unempl. -0.0539063 0.02878 -1.87 0.061 -0.110322 0.002509
liceo 0.3659553 0.00875 41.84 0.000 0.348811 0.383099
father w. col. 0.0714347 0.01003 7.12 0.000 0.05177 0.091099
mother w. col. 0.0513431 0.0131 3.92 0.000 0.02567 0.077016
mother out l.f. -0.0519146 0.00928 -5.60 0.000 -0.070097 -0.033732
girl -0.026166 0.00866 -3.02 0.003 -0.043141 -0.009191
LR chi2 = 6984:58, Prob > chi2 = 0:0000
Log likelihood =  10163:986 , Pseudo R2 = 0:2557
Table 10: Logit regression 2004, marginal eects
enrollment @s=@x Std. Err. z P > jzj 95% Conf. Int.
eort 0.1321386 0.00477 27.69 0.000 0.122786 0.141491
score 15 0.1789516 0.00413 43.36 0.000 0.170863 0.18704
private -0.0259939 0.01581 -1.64 0.100 -0.056988 0.005
father grad. 0.1448093 0.01241 11.67 0.000 0.120487 0.169131
mother grad. 0.12977 0.01395 9.30 0.000 0.102423 0.157117
father dip. 0.063882 0.00734 8.71 0.000 0.049506 0.078258
mother dip. 0.0892297 0.00734 12.15 0.000 0.074835 0.103625
father unempl. -0.0340361 0.02507 -1.36 0.175 -0.083164 0.015092
liceo 0.3345468 0.00614 54.50 0.000 0.322516 0.346577
father w. col. 0.0632308 0.00758 8.34 0.000 0.048372 0.078089
mother w. col. 0.046489 0.01014 4.59 0.000 0.026623 0.066355
mother out l.f. -0.0527415 0.00718 -7.35 0.000 -0.066808 -0.038675
girl 0.012069 0.00664 1.82 0.069 -0.000938 0.025076
LR chi2 (13) = 9601:84, Prob > chi2 = 0:0000
Log likelihood =  11909:836 , Pseudo R2 = 0:2873
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